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Does Monetary Policy Have Differential
State-Level Effects?
An Empirical Evaluation
The paper examines whether monetary policy has similar effects across major states in the
Indian polity. Impulse response functions from an estimated Structural Vector Auto
Regression (SVAR) reveal two sets of states: a core of states that respond to monetary
policy in a significant fashion vis-à-vis others whose response is less significant. The paper
attempts to trace the reasons for the differential response of these two sets of states in terms
of financial deepening and differential industry mix.
policies pursued). In the Indian context,
although there have been several studies
as to the impact of monetary policy on the
national economy, there has been little
investigation of the interrelationships
among sub-national economies and asso-
ciated feedbacks from policy shocks.1 Con-
sequently, no comprehensive look at state-
level response to a policy change is avail-
able. Also lacking is a systematic analysis
of why state economies may respond dif-
ferently to monetary policy shocks. This
is surprising, since state-level data offer
a rich avenue for exploring the empirical
significance of possible transmission
mechanisms for monetary policy. The
present paper attempts to address this lacuna
by presenting a state-level analysis of
monetary policy effects. Rather than con-
fining itself to merely identifying dif-
ferential responses, it also seeks to inves-
tigate the reasons for such differential re-
sponses. We follow the SVAR methodo-
logy that claims as a major advantage
its ability to identify monetary policy
shocks adjusted for the influences of other
concurrent developments.
Our analysis reveals that the response of
different states to monetary policy shocks
is, in fact, quite distinct. The size of a
state’s response to a monetary policy shock
is positively related to the share of manu-
facturing in the NSDP (net state domestic
product), which may be viewed as evi-
dence favouring an ‘interest rate channel’.
The analysis also provides support for the
fact that certain states, containing a rela-
tively larger concentration of small firms,
tend to be more responsive to monetary
policy shocks than states with a smaller
concentration of the same, which, in
essence, is testimony to the existence of
a ‘broad credit channel’.
II
Differential Impact of
Monetary Policy:
Issues and Empirics
The literature on the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism suggests several reasons
why the actions of the authorities might
have differential state-level effects. These
include, among others (i) statewise differ-
ences in the mix of interest sensitive in-
dustries, (ii) differences in the mixture of
large versus small firms across states, and
(iii) the differential financial deepening
across states.
Differential Industry Mix
It is, acknowledged that the interest rate
elasticities of credit demand differ across
industries. These differential elasticities,
in conjunction with differing industry
mixes across states, may account for
differential sub-national effects of mone-
tary policy. It is also a stylised fact that
industry is more credit-dependent than
either agriculture or services and there-
fore, relatively industrialised states are
likely to be more affected by monetary
policy shocks than their less industrialised
counterparts.
Differential Mix of Firms
State-level differences in the composi-
tion and concentration of industry and
the sources of credit available to each
could also lead to dissimilar responses to
I
Introduction
The prevailing paradigm of monetarypolicy predicates a uniform un-differentiated effect of such policy
on the national economy. Such a view
ignores the fact that in reality, any nation
is composed of diverse albeit interlinked
regions, which might respond differently
to identical macroeconomic stimuli. For
example, the effect of a change in the price
of foodgrains might be quite different for
a region which is a dominant producer of
that commodity vis-à-vis another region,
which is an important consumer. Likewise,
a rise in the energy price (for example,
fuel) might impact different regions un-
evenly, in view of the differential impor-
tance of fuel in the consumption basket of
various regions. The idea that monetary
policy can likewise have varied effects
across regions is a short and logical
next step.
In large federal structures like the US,
Canada and India, an additional dimension
is introduced by the existence of compo-
nent federal states with their own govern-
ments and a measure of policy autonomy.
While the concept of an economic region
is logically quite distinct from that of a
federal state, the latter provides a conve-
nient anchor for studying regional dimen-
sions of macroeconomic policy. This is so
because in most countries, data is organised
statewise rather than according to eco-
nomic regions and also over a historical
period, states develop distinct economic
characteristics (partly due to inherent
geographical and environmental features
and partly owing to differing economic
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monetary policy. The credit view of
monetary policy, enunciated by Bernanke
and Blinder (1988), contends that mon-
etary policy affects banks by directly af-
fecting their ability to provide loans.
Moreover, information costs and transac-
tions costs require small firms to deal with
financial intermediaries, primarily banks,
to meet their credit needs. In contrast, large
firms usually have greater and varied access
to external, non-bank sources of funds.
Consequently, activity in a state that has
a high concentration of small firms could
be especially sensitive to the policy of the
monetary authorities.
Differential Financial Deepening
Recent theoretical work on possible
credit channels for the transmission of
monetary policy actions to economic ac-
tivity suggests that the mix of large versus
small firms and large versus small banks
is a crucial determinant of responses to
monetary policy. Kashyap and Stein (1997)
have pointed out that monetary policy is
likely to have a relatively larger impact on
countries having comparatively bank-de-
pendent firms and a relatively large per-
centage of small banks. The credit channel
will be weakest in countries with a rela-
tively low percentage of small banks and
comparatively few bank-dependent cus-
tomers. Dornbusch et al (1998) observe
that, with the exception of the UK, the
credit channel is more likely to be impor-
tant in Europe, where banks provide the
bulk of firms’ credit. In contrast, financing
in the US (and in the UK) is much less
bank-centric because capital markets play
a central role in the financing of firms. In
the Indian context, the process of financial
deepening has not been uniform across
states. Some states have experienced a
significant growth of banking and insur-
ance activities vis-a-vis certain other states
which have remained relatively under-
banked. It might therefore be possible to
envisage a situation wherein adequately
banked states are more prone to the effects
of a monetary policy shock as compared
with those which are not.
Differential Regional Impact of
Monetary Policy: The Empirics
Some of the earlier literature in this area
had investigated the effects of monetary
policy on inter-regional banking flows, as
opposed to economic activity. In one of
the earliest regional studies for the US,
Miller (1978) found that Fed policy actions
do not affect regional banking flows dif-
ferently. Typical of these studies is the use
of a reduced form equation that regresses
personal income, earning or employment
on the federal government revenues and
the national money supply. These models
are applied at the regional level to test the
proposition that monetary policy has an
important impact on nominal income. An
important study in this context is  Garrison
and Chang (1979), which examines the
effect of monetary policy on income vari-
ables in the eight regions2 of the US. Their
study finds that monetary policy has dif-
ferential effects across regions, with an
especially large impact in the Rocky
Mountain region. In contrast, Garrison and
Kort (1983) investigate the impact of
monetary policy on state-level employ-
ment for the 1960-78 period and find that
states comprising the Great Lakes region
are relatively more responsive to money
supply changes, while states in the Rocky
Mountain were the least responsive to such
changes.
A major shortcoming of such studies is
their attempt to measure monetary policy
impact region-by-region, without account-
ing for feedback effects among regions.
More recently, Taylor and Yucel (1996)
have attempted to rectify this drawback by
using a VAR to incorporate the inter-
regional linkages, but their study is con-
fined to a small time period (1982-95) and
considers only four states, which, in a way,
limits the empirical appeal of the model.
Subsequently, Carlino and Defina (1998,
Table 1: Structure of NSDP in Different States
(as per cent of statewise NSDP)
State Activity 1969-70 1979-80 1989-90 1998-99
Haryana Agriculture and Allied 66.3 48.0 45.2 35.5
Industry 14.4 21.6 23.1 24.8
Services 19.3 30.3 31.7 39.7
Punjab Agriculture and Allied 59.4 51.6 49.8 42.5
Industry 15.2 17.1 21.3 21.8
Services 25.4 31.3 28.9 35.7
Rajasthan Agriculture and Allied 49.6 47.2 44.8 33.1
Industry 16.9 19.1 19.8 23.4
Services 33.6 33.8 35.4 43.4
Bihar Agriculture and Allied 54.4 44.9 39.3 33.0
Industry 25.4 25.1 29.6 24.7
Services 20.2 30.0 31.0 42.3
Orissa Agriculture and Allied 65.3 55.1 47.2 36.1
Industry 12.5 18.1 19.5 20.0
Services 22.2 26.8 33.3 43.9
West Bengal Agriculture and Allied 42.4 32.3 33.4 32.5
Industry 25.3 18.7 26.8 22.4
Services 32.2 49.0 39.8 45.1
Madhya Pradesh Agriculture and Allied 59.0 41.2 43.5 35.1
Industry 17.0 26.1 24.5 26.2
Services 24.1 32.8 32.0 38.6
Uttar Pradesh Agriculture and Allied 60.6 48.1 42.2 35.7
Industry 14.3 21.6 20.2 21.3
Services 25.1 30.3 37.6 43.0
Gujarat Agriculture and Allied 41.7 38.1 29.1 22.5
Industry 25.8 26.6 32.0 34.7
Services 32.5 35.3 38.9 42.8
Maharashtra Agriculture and Allied 30.1 27.6 24.8 18.2
Industry 33.8 35.4 34.4 31.5
Services 36.1 37.0 40.8 50.2
Andhra Pradesh Agriculture and Allied 54.6 48.6 41.1 30.9
Industry 15.0 17.4 17.6 22.7
Services 30.3 34.0 41.4 46.4
Karnataka Agriculture and Allied 53.3 46.1 37.2 29.5
Industry 24.4 29.4 23.2 28.1
Services 22.4 24.5 39.6 42.4
Kerala Agriculture and Allied 53.8 41.8 33.4 26.8
Industry 14.3 19.9 25.8 21.3
Services 31.9 38.3 40.8 51.9
Tamil Nadu Agriculture and Allied 38.7 29.9 24.0 21.2
Industry 26.7 34.4 30.6 27.1
Services 34.6 35.7 45.5 51.6
All India Agriculture and Allied 47.6 39.8 34.5 28.5
(as per cent of NDP) Industry 21.3 22.9 24.7 23.7
Services 31.1 37.3 40.8 47.8
Source: Central Statistical Organisation and Directorates of Economics and Statistics of respective state
governments.
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1999) have attempted to rectify this short-
coming by examining how monetary policy
affects real personal income in each of
the 48 contiguous states of the US. The
analysis employs SVAR models estimated
over the period 1958:1 to 1992:4; these
models explicitly allowed for feedback
among regions. Impulse response func-
tions from the estimated SVARs revealed
a broad pattern in which state real personal
income tended to fall after an unantici-
pated increase of one percentage point in
the federal funds rate. Nonetheless, the
differences in state responses are evident,
and in some cases, substantial.
In the European context, Ramaswamy
and Sloek (1997) found that the full effect
of an unanticipated contraction in mone-
tary policy on output in Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Germany, Netherlands and UK
takes roughly twice as long to occur and
is twice as deep as in Denmark, France,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Using
VAR techniques, Gerlach and Smets (1996)
found that while the effects of monetary
policy shocks were not vastly different
across countries in their study, they were
somewhat larger in Germany than in France
or Italy. Dornbusch et al (1998) have also
employed a small model of six European
countries and found that the impact effect
of a monetary policy shock (changes in
short-term interest rates) has a lag of eight
months in Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK,
nine months in Germany and 12 months
in France. In sum, while these studies tend
to disagree on an individual country’s
responsiveness to monetary policy shocks,
they are broadly in consonance with the
fact that sensitivity to these shocks will
differ across European countries.
Similar problems have come to the fore
in the context of the European Monetary
Union (EMU). Under the EMU, member
countries will be subject to common
monetary policy shocks. Given the diver-
sity in the economic and financial struc-
tures across the EMU economies, these
common monetary shocks can be reason-
ably expected to have differential effects.
However, little is known about what dif-
ferences might arise, given the absence of
any historical experience in Europe with
a common currency. In a pioneering study,
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), using
a SVAR approach, demonstrated that the
incidence of supply disturbances was very
different for countries at the centre of the
European community (the ‘core’ coun-
tries) comprising of  Germany, France,
Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark) vis-
a-vis the other EC members (UK, Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Greece). In particular,
supply shocks to the ‘core’ countries were
both smaller and more correlated across
neighbouring countries as compared with
supply shocks to the ‘non-core’ (or peri-
phery) countries. This would seem to
suggest that a uniform monetary policy
might not necessarily produce the desired
results under an EMU.
Some Indian Issues
The majority of the regional studies
in the Indian situation have focused on
examining the issue of state finances
[Venkataraman 1967; Bagchi et al 1992],
widening interstate disparities [Kurian
2000], their macroeconomic performance
and differential interstate inequalities
[Ahluwalia 2000], and sources of differ-
ences in per capita state domestic product
[Dasgupta et al 2000], variations in size, in-
come and structural characteristics of states
[Shand and Bhide 2000], and dispersion
of per capita incomes of states vis-à-vis the
national average [Chaudhuri 2000]. The
Reserve Bank of India has also been bring-
ing out the status of state finances annually
since 1950. Since the nation comprises of
several states with not only differential
growth patterns [Ahluwalia 2000] but also
differential abilities to respond to mone-
tary policy shocks, it would be of interest
to understand the extent of such reactions
at the state-level and this aspect is the
predominant concern of our study.
III
Some Stylised Facts
on Indian States
We have confined our attention to 14
major Indian states, viz, Haryana, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal
(WB), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Uttar
Pradesh (UP), Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Andhra Pradesh (AP), Karnataka, Kerala,
and Tamil Nadu. However, the sample
contains all the major states of India and
Table 2: Share of Unregistered Manufacturing in NSDP in Different States
(as per cent of statewise NSDP)
State/Year 1969-70 1979-80 1989-90 1998-99
Haryana 3.2 4.0 7.7 6.6
Punjab 4.0 5.4 6.6 5.2
Rajasthan 6.7 5.3 5.1 4.8
Bihar 14.1 3.2 7.1 1.9
Orissa 2.8 3.3 4.4 4.8
WB 4.5 3.5 8.4 8.6
MP 4.5 5.1 5.6 6.6
UP 4.7 6.7 5.6 5.5
Gujarat 4.4 4.2 6.0 9.2
Maharashtra 5.9 5.7 7.4 8.7
Andhra Pradesh 5.6 5.2 4.1 5.6
Karnataka 7.7 9.5 4.3 9.7
Kerala 3.8 6.9 5.6 6.5
Tamil Nadu NA 11.8 7.1 7.8
All India (as per cent of NDP) 5.4 6.0 5.9 5.7
Source: Central Statistical Organisation and Directorates of Economics and Statistics of respective state
governments.
Table 3: Share of Banking and Insurance in NSDP in Different States
(as per cent of statewise NSDP)
State/Year 1969-70 1979-80 1989-90 1998-99
Haryana 1.1 2.1 3.3 4.5
Punjab 1.5 2.4 4.3 5.9
Rajasthan 1.3 2.6 4.1 5.4
Bihar 0.8 1.4 3.2 4.2
Orissa 0.7 1.5 3.0 4.7
West Bengal 2.2 3.1 6.7 6.8
Madhya Pradesh 1.2 2.8 5.3 3.9
Uttar Pradesh 1.1 2.2 5.1 4.6
Gujarat 2.4 3.2 7.4 7.2
Maharashtra 2.8 4.4 8.8 12.0
Andhra Pradesh 1.5 2.5 5.9 5.5
Karnataka 1.6 2.3 6.2 6.4
Kerala 1.2 2.6 7.3 7.4
Tamil Nadu 2.1 2.9 5.4 9.4
All India (as per cent of NDP) 1.8 2.7 4.5 7.1
Source: Central Statistical Organisation and Directorates of Economics and Statistics of respective state
governments.
Economic and Political Weekly November 23, 20024726
it is also in line with the standard practice
in comparing the economic performance
of Indian states that treats smaller or north-
eastern states differently.3 The sample
period for the study is the 30-year period
1969-70 through 1988-99. As our interest
is primarily on regional impact of mon-
etary policy, we did not consider the pre-
1970s (that is, pre-bank nationalisation)
in our sample period.
How far do these states differ structur-
ally? Table 1 provides an overview of the
structure of net state domestic product
(NSDP) at four representative time points
encompassing the time period under study
(1969-1999). As is evident from the table,
at the all-India level, while the degree of
industrialisation has increased over the
period, certain states have witnessed a
greater degree of industrialisation vis-à-vis
the all-India average. Illustratively, during
1969-70, while the industrialisation at the
all-India level as per cent of NDP was 21.3
per cent, the same for Orissa was merely
12.5 per cent as compared to Maharashtra
at 33.8 per cent. Although the extent of
industrialisation went up during 1989-90
to 24.7 per cent at the all-India level, states
like Rajasthan and Orissa continued to lag
behind their more developed counterparts
like Maharashtra and Gujarat.
This apart, various states have differing
degree of formalism in their economic
activity. As regards the role of industry
mix, Table 2 shows the share of unregis-
tered manufacturing in NSDP in the con-
cerned states at the four benchmark time
points mentioned above. Without loss of
generality, unregistered manufacturing
would indicate the dominance of small
units in a particular state. As compared
with the all-India average of 5.5-6.0 per
cent over the entire time span covered,
certain states have a relatively high pro-
portion of such firms. Notable among these
include Haryana and West Bengal (espe-
cially in the latter half of the 1980s and
the 1990s); among others, Maharashtra
and Tamil Nadu have had a significant
proportion of unregistered manufacturing
in NSDP, although for the latter, the pro-
portion has declined in the latter half of
the eighties. The same for Karnataka has
also remained at a high level, albeit with
a significant fall in 1989-90.
The evidence is corroborated when we
consider the penetration of banking and
insurance in the sample states (Table 3).
States like Maharashtra, Gujarat, and to a
lesser extent, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West
Bengal have a significant presence in
banking and insurance as evidenced from
the share of these sectors in NSDP
vis-à-vis the all-India average. For in-
stance, during 1998-99, while the share
of banking and insurance in NSDP for
Maharashtra was 12.0 per cent, the same
for Gujarat, Kerala and Tamil Nadu was
7.2, 7.4 and 9.4 per cent, respectively. As
compared to this, the penetration of
banking and insurance in states like
Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and
Uttar Pradesh witnessed a declining trend
over the period.
IV
Empirical Exploration:
Methodology and Results
The available literature tends to suggest
several possible channels through which
monetary policy could impinge differen-
tially across regions. These include, for
instance, state-level differences in the mix
of industries, in the number of small versus
large firms and in the extent of financial
deepening.
In order to test our hypothesis that
whether monetary policy shocks have
differential effects in different states in
India, we employ a vector auto regression
(VAR) framework, with state-specific
SDP, economywide GDP, monetary
policy, and a variable capturing struc-
tural shock. Towards this end, the study
employs annual data on NSDP for the 14
major states in India as mentioned earlier
for the period 1969 to 1999 for which
consistent data set is available.4 In addi-
tion, we also have the real gross domestic
product at the national level, an index of
food price  and an indicator of monetary
policy shock, viz, the growth rate of real
money supply, defined as (M3/P).5 The
inclusion of Pf/P in the VAR deserves
some explanation. Emerging market econo-
mies are often susceptible to shocks in
food prices. Food, in particular, consti-
tutes a dominant proportion of their con-
sumption basket and especially so in rela-
tively backward states, where a significant
part of incomes is often spent on food.
Keeping this in mind, an index of food
prices has been included as an
additional variable.
The Framework
The analysis focuses on the dynamic
behaviour of an n x 1 co-variance station-
ary vector defined by the relation
Zt = [Yti, Yt, (M3/P)t, (Pf/P)t]' (1)
where, Y is the NDP, Yi is the NSDP in
state i, Pf /P is an index of  food price and
M3/P is the monetary policy variable.
t denotes time period.
The dynamics of Zt are represented by
a VAR
AZt = B(L)Zt–1 + et (2)
where A is an n x n matrix of coefficients
describing the contemporaneous correla-
tion among the variables, B(L) is an
n x n matrix of polynomials in the lag
operator L, and et = [ε1,t, ε2,t, …, εn–1,t, εn,t]
is an n x 1 vector of structural distur-
bances.
Solving for Zt produces the following
reduced form system
Zt = C(L)Zt–1 + ut (3)
where, C(L) =A–1B(L) is an infinite-order
lag polynomial, and ut = A–1et describes
the relationship between the model’s
reduced-form residuals and the model’s
structural residuals.
In order to achieve exact identification,
instead of using Sims (1980) type trian-
gular decomposition, sufficient restrictions
are placed on the variance-covariance
matrix of structural errors. For an exact
identification, six restrictions have been
placed on the A matrix. These are motiva-
ted by practical consideration of the trans-
mission of economic changes through sub-
national and national economies. In parti-
cular, we have assumed that the  food price
shock is unrelated to other shocks in the
model. Secondly, while nationwide NDP is
influenced by both monetary policy as well
as relative food price shocks, the state-
specific NSDPs are influenced, apart from
monetary policy and relative food price
shocks, by economywide NDP shocks.
Table 5: ADF Tests of Variables
State Levela Growth Rateb
NSDP-Haryana –0.61 –5.84
NSDP-Punjab –1.71 –5.05
NSDP-Rajasthan –1.40 –5.85
NSDP-Bihar –2.16 –5.13
NSDP-Orissa –2.18 –7.41
NSDP-WB 1.84 –4.22
NSDP-MP –0.55 –7.46
NSDP-UP –1.18 –5.21
NSDP-Gujarat –0.23 –5.03
NSDP-Maharashtra 1.44 –4.39
NSDP-Andhra Pradesh –0.90 –6.27
NSDP-Karnataka 1.45 –4.41
NSDP-Kerala 0.62 –2.98
NSDP-Tamil Nadu 0.91 –3.85
Relative Price of Food –2.40 –5.46
Net Domestic Product 1.76 –4.05
M3/P 1.92 –4.56
a Equation includes an intercept and time trend.
b Equation includes an intercept term.
Note: The 95 per cent values for a and b are –3.96
and –2.96, respectively.
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This provides us with the following struc-
ture of A, viz,
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
Unit Root Tests
In order to avoid spuriousness, the
variables used in the estimation process
need to be stationary. Table 5 reports the
results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root tests applied to the levels
and first differences of the system’s vari-
ables. As Table 5 shows, all the variables
are found to be I(1). Hence, the framework
as described in (1) has been taken in
growth rates.
Empirical Estimates
The obvious question that arises is: how
can one measure the effectiveness of
monetary policy in a particular state? Since
all the variables are taken in real terms,
monetary policy is postulated to be more
effective in a state where the monetary
shocks explain a larger proportion of output
variance of that state. Given the annual
data series employed in the study, we
examined the 5-year ahead forecast error
variance decomposition (FEVD) of g(Yi)’s,
and compared the proportion of FEVD of
g(Yi) that are explained by monetary shock.
An interesting pattern emerged when we
delved into these numbers. Clearly, there
is a clustering around of the states into two
groups, the former in which monetary
policy has higher impulses, and the latter,
in which it was (relatively speaking) lower.
This impact of the monetary shock is
summarised in Tables 6 and 7, respectively
for these two sets of states. Table 6 shows
the states where monetary shocks have a
less significant role in explaining state-
wise output variance; the opposite is the
case depicted in Table 7.
As evident, not all states respond to the
same extent to a common monetary policy
shock. In Table 6, the impact of a monetary
policy shock is generally found to be high
in the first year for states such as Uttar
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh; for all states,
state NSDP generally declines during the
first year following the policy shock and
increases thereafter. The impulse responses
indicate that unanticipated monetary policy
shocks typically have their maximum
impact on NSDP after three years. For
example, a policy innovation results in
6.83 per cent increase in NSDP in Punjab
in the second year. The effect of the
policy shock then builds to a maximum
of 7.13 per cent in the fourth year and
dies down thereafter.
Table 7, on the other hand, depicts the
reverse scenario where the impact of a
policy shock on statewise output vari-
ance is significant. As evident, most of
the states included therein respond quite
significantly to the policy innovation.
For instance, the policy shock results in
a substantial rise in NSDP in Andhra
Pradesh in year 1, but subsequently
dampens to 26.79 per cent by the end
of the fifth year. Of these five states,
Gujarat shows the most significant re-
sponse to the policy shock with a high
of 36.57 per cent; the lowest being for
Maharashtra with 11.59 per cent. Inter-
estingly, for most of these states, the
effect of the policy shock is maximum
in the first year; the exception being
Maharashtra, which shows the maxi-
mum response in the fifth year.
How far are these results in line with
the stylised facts alluded to earlier? While
there is an element of subjectivism in the
clustering criterion in the sense that there
is no statistical testing of the differences
in output variance explained by mone-
tary shock in state i vis-à-vis state j, the
distinct pattern of clustering and the
output variance between the two sets of
states is, more or less, in line with the
expected structural differences among
the states. There are, however, certain
exceptions to the observed attributes for
certain states. This needs to be further
explored.
V
Concluding Observations
The present paper employs time-series
techniques to examine whether monetary
policy had symmetric effects across major
states in India during the period 1969-70
to 1998-99. The impulse response func-
tions from an estimated SVAR reveal a
core of states responding to monetary policy
in a  pro-active fashion than several other
states. The study attempted to identify these
core (and non-core) states that were more
(less) sensitive to such policy shocks.
Combining this with the earlier informa-
tion on the concentration of manufactur-
ing and the degree of financial deepening
across states, it is clear that those states
which have a greater concentration of
manufacturing units or are relatively in-
tensively banked tend to be more respon-
sive to such shocks.
The analysis began by setting out the
basic facts on 14 Indian states, related to
those aspects likely to give rise to shock
asymmetry, viz, industry-mix, industrial
concentration and financial deepening. A
SVAR model was elaborated with a view
to examining the impact of monetary policy
innovations on output in each state. Based
on our analysis, states were classified into
two categories: (i) those significantly af-
fected by monetary policy shocks (Type I
states); and (ii) those where monetary
policy is relatively less effective (Type II
states). Our conclusions lend support to
what our earlier theoretical discussion leads
us to expect, viz, broadly speaking, states
with a heavy concentration of manu-
facturing enterprises and greater financial
deepening tend to be more sensitive to
Table 6: States Where Monetary Shocks Have Less Significant Role in Statewise
Output Variance: Proportion of Statewise Output Variance Explained by
Monetary Shocks
(Per cent)
Year Haryana Punjab UP Bihar Orissa WB MP Kerala TN
1 0.76 1.95 6.72 0.26 0.01 3.23 4.61 1.10 0.03
2 2.35 6.83 4.65 2.03 0.02 4.78 2.90 2.11 0.30
3 2.51 7.00 4.61 2.22 0.04 7.38 3.45 2.12 0.52
4 2.52 7.13 4.71 2.22 0.04 7.30 3.51 2.10 0.52
5 2.58 7.11 4.71 2.22 0.04 7.29 3.53 2.12 0.55
Table 7: States Where Monetary Shocks Have a Significant Role in Statewise Output
Variance: Proportion of Statewise Output Variance Explained by Monetary Shocks
(Per cent)
Rajasthan Gujarat Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Karnataka
1 29.94 36.57 11.59 28.85 28.83
2 24.90 31.65 11.45 27.25 24.46
3 23.87 30.03 11.89 26.96 23.72
4 23.75 29.94 11.96 26.77 23.54
5 23.73 29.90 11.97 26.79 23.49
A =
 [ ]  (4)
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monetary policy shocks than relatively
under-banked/less industrialised states.
There are, however, certain exceptions to
the observed attributes of some of the states.
This raises the possibility that different
states are subject to shocks, which are
asymmetric and hence, that in a sense, the
Indian federal economy is an incomplete
currency area. Monetary policy may then
be more responsive to the shocks occur-
ring in certain states, and while smooth-
ening out output fluctuations in this group
of states, might be leaving other types of
shocks occurring in the remaining states,
largely unattended. Further investigation
is of course, necessary to confirm the
presence and extent of such asymmetries
as well as examine in detail their sources.
If it does turn out that the regional asym-
metries are indeed significant with the
Indian federation falling well short of an
optimum currency area, then institutional
changes of a far-reaching kind in the
monetary policy mechanism would be
called for. While it may be premature to
speculate on the nature of the required
changes, there is no gainsaying that in view
of severe resource constraints faced by
several Indian states [Rao 2002], monetary
policy would need to take regional
perspective into account.
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Notes
[The views expressed in the paper are the authors’
own, and not necessarily those of the institutions
to which they belong. The authors would like to
thank, without implicating M D Patra for his
insightful comments on an earlier draft.]
1 See for example, Singh et al (1982), Jadhav
(1994), Rangarajan (1988), Rangarajan and
Arif (1990) and Reddy (2002).
2 These regions are New England, Mid-east, Great
Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky
Mountain and Far West.
3 The sample coincides with Ahluwalia’s set of
14 states for the sake of comparing the SDP
among Indian states [Ahluwalia 2000].
4 The data has been culled out from the Database
of the Indian Economy (H L Chandok), National
Accounts Data (Central Statistical Organisation)
and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian
Economy (Reserve Bank of India).
5 Both state-specific NSDP’s and economywide
NDP have been taken at factor cost at constant
prices.
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